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Abstract 
In this paper we seek to complement the scarce empirical evidence for middle-income 
countries about the effects of unconditional central government transfers on subnational 
fiscal behaviour. To this end, we have used an unbalanced panel of 18 Uruguayan regional 
governments from 1991 to 2016. Our database includes data from the regional budget and 
other sources of information, which allows us to investigate the role of political economy 
factors. The application of panel data techniques with the use of instrumental variables 
highlights the presence of a sizeable flypaper effect and a significant role of variables 
related with the political economy design of sub-national finances. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades’ numerous countries have been engaged in processes to reallocate 
political power and fiscal responsibilities from national to subnational governments. The 
increase in the amount of resources and functions transferred from upper to lower tiers of 
government has brought important economic consequences. In such a context, the 
intergovernmental public transfers have come to assume an even more substantial role on 
the sub-national finances and on the overall fiscal policy of an economy. Although this 
source of local governments revenues may help attain important policy objectives, it has 
the potential to alter the budgetary behavior of the recipient and create situations in which 
their expected beneﬁts could eventually vanish (Oates 2005). 
The challenge of fiscal federalism literature is not only how to design suitable 
decentralizing policies, but also how to make sure that their implementation is successful 
(Bahl and Martínez-Vázquez 2006). Understanding how recipient governments spend 
intergovernmental transfers is essential for the design of efficient regional fiscal policy. 
Understanding also why governments spend citizens’ incomes as they do provide valuable 
insights as to how citizen preferences are represented in government policies. 
One of the most documented empirical regularities in the fiscal federalism literature is 
the so-called flypaper effect. This effect holds that the propensity of sub-national 
governmental units to spend out of intergovernmental unconditional transfers is higher 
than the propensity to spend out of private income. This empirical result has significant 
implications for regional fiscal policy design due to it could suggests, for example, the 
presence of sub-national authorities that seek to expand public spending for their own 
purposes beyond levels desired by the community. In this sense, "it suggests that political 
competition is insufficient to provide needed fiscal discipline" (Oates 1999). Another 
important related empirical topic is to determine whether this flypaper effect is 
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symmetrical by focusing on the effects of transfers variations. An asymmetrical effect 
exists when the local expense response differs depending on whether grants are increased 
or decreased (Gamkhar and Oates 1996). In this sense, losses in transfers may be partly 
compensated by local governments willing to preserve expenditures by raising additional 
taxes. However, local governments may magnify the spending response to cuts in grants 
by lowering own revenues as well, which has an impact on the level of expenditure and 
hence on the quantity and quality of local public services provided. 
In Uruguay, the topic of decentralization has acquired importance in view of the 
increasing level of transfers from the central to the sub-national public sector (regional 
governments) and the enhanced autonomy that the Constitutional Reform of 1996 has 
given to sub-national authorities. Despite the increasing role of local decision-making 
bodies in Uruguay, any attempts have been made so far to understand thoroughly regional 
governments’ expenditure behavior and the way in which it is influenced by 
intergovernmental transfers. This work seeks to begin to fill this dearth of empirical 
evidence by focusing on the responsiveness in expenditures of 18 Uruguayan regional 
governments to central government unconditional transfers over the 1991-2016, period 
during which there have been significant variations both in the regional local rates applied 
and their tax bases.  
The paper has two major goals. Firstly, determinate the magnitude of the reaction of 
regional governments budgets to increases in private income as compared to increases in 
unconditional transfers. Secondly, test if the effect is symmetrical by focusing on the sign 
of the variation in transfers (cuts versus increases). 
Empirical results show a significant and sizeable flypaper effect but not asymmetry 
effects. Our estimations also identify that political economy factors play a crucial role in 
the regional budgeting processes. In this sense, we could observe the importance of the 
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political alignment between the central and regional government and the condition of 
being a department that has varied of political party in office during the period (switch 
department) to receive more regional transfers. Estimations also show that local spending 
is subject to electoral cycles, and that the increase of votes intra-cyclical volatility 
(passage of votes from one party to another between national and regional elections) has 
negatively impacted the level of regional spending. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews economic literature devoted to the 
analysis of asymmetrical effects of regional intergovernmental transfers. Section 3 
presents the empirical background, while section 4 describes the regional public finances 
of Uruguay. Section 5 details the methodology. Section 6 presents econometric issues. 
Empirical results are presented in section 7, and robustness exercises in section 8. Section 
9 concludes. 
 
 
2. Sub-national public finances and the flypaper effect 
A widely accepted economic principle of fiscal federalism literature argues that “finance 
follows function”. The principle emphasizes that both the amount of revenues required 
by a sub-national government as well as the adequate choice of its revenue sources depend 
on the specific characteristics of the assigned expenditure responsibilities’ and the cost of 
financing them (Bahl 1999; Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda 2011).  
Although there are many ways to categorize expenditure assignments to sub-national 
governments, an essential distinction is whether: (i) the assignments correspond to 
discretionary decisions made by the sub-national government; or (ii) they correspond to 
responsibilities that have been delegated by the central government, which involve non-
discretionary decisions by sub-national governments. In this context, sub-national 
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autonomy is required if and only if an expenditure function has been assigned as an 
exclusive or own responsibility to the sub-national level. In contrast, even though 
delegated functions are implemented by sub-national authorities, the ultimate 
responsibility over these functions may be interpreted as falling upon the central 
government. So, discretion, if allowed, could only be exerted within certain limits and 
controls. Frequent examples of delegated expenditure responsibilities are education and 
health services. Service delivery in these sectors is normally assigned to sub-national 
governments, and regardless whether the distinction is made in the law between own and 
delegated, significant shares of the sub-national education and health budgets are devoted 
to meet national standards regarding quality and coverage. In contrast, service delivery, 
for example, for street cleaning and lighting, whether the laws make the distinction 
between own and delegated responsibilities generally are associated with decisions that 
are fully discretionary at sub-national level. 
A key issue in the design of fiscal federalism policy is the form in which the lower-level 
governments are financed. If there are no savings, sub-national revenues must be equal to 
sub-national expenditures. The presence of fiscal vertical imbalance typically implies that 
sub-national expenditures are larger than sub-national own revenue collections. To 
eliminate this vertical imbalance, the central government must provide additional 
resources in the form of intergovernmental transfers. The non-discretionary (delegated) 
expenditure responsibilities should be primarily financed by conditional 
intergovernmental transfers. If the central government is committed with achieving 
certain national standards, then it should provide the funds required to ensure that those 
standards are met nationwide. But intergovernmental transfers are also necessary to 
finance own sub-national responsibilities’; this financing must be unconditional to allow 
for discretionary sub-national decisions. Within this framework, the intensification of 
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decentralization processes in many countries has led to a growing interest of scholars to 
understand the overall effects of these non-discretionary fiscal transfers (BID 2017). 
The effects of non-conditional intergovernmental transfers have traditionally been studied 
from a welfare economic perspective (Musgrave 1959; Musgrave and Musgrave 1984). 
Based on the median voter theory, this perspective predicts that an increase in 
intergovernmental grants will have the same effect on sub-national expenditure 
adjustments as a change in citizen income. In both cases, sub-national governments are 
expected to raise expenditures and reduce taxes. More specifically, with perfect 
information and political competition, the allocative and distributive effects of non-
conditional fiscal transfers (grants) to sub-national authorities should not be different 
from the effects of distributing the lump-sum funds directly to residents. The standard 
fiscal federalism approach, formalized by Bradford and Oates (1971), predicts that grants 
to local governments are equivalent to increments of community income. The reason is 
that money is fungible and thus a local government should have the same propensity to 
spend out of individual income or lump-sum grants. This result is known as the veil 
hypothesis because it suggests that intergovernmental transfers are simply a veil for 
central government's tax rebates (Oates 1999). Nevertheless, a large body of empirical 
literature has produced results that are at variance with prior predictions. Several analyses 
have showed that the stimulus to local public expenditure from non-conditional 
intergovernmental transfers far exceeds the effect of equal increases in local private 
income. In this sense, one of the most documented empirical regularities in the early fiscal 
federalism literature is the so-called flypaper effect (Henderson 1968; Gramlich 1969). 
This effect holds that the propensity of sub-national governmental units to spend out of 
intergovernmental unconditional transfers is higher than the propensity to spend out of 
private income. The flypaper expression captures the idea that money sticks where it hits: 
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money in the private sector (i.e., from private income) tends to be allocated to private 
consumption rather than being taxed away, while money in the public sector (i.e., from 
ﬁscal transfers) tends to be spent by the public sector rather than being rebated back to 
citizens1.  
Attempts to provide rationality to the so-called ﬂypaper effect can be divided into two 
broad groups: empirical and theoretical arguments.  
The empirical explanations are based on two types of views. Firstly, some scholars argue 
that non-fungible conditional ﬁscal transfers could be miss-classiﬁed as unconditional 
ones; grants perceived as unconditional by the researcher may implicitly include some 
matching elements and thus produce a greater stimulatory impact than pure lump sum 
transfers (Moffitt 1984; Megdal 1987; Wyckoff 1991; Baker et al. 1999). Secondly, 
others researchers have interpreted the overreaction of spending to these transfers as an 
econometric problem resulting from model misspeciﬁcation. Within this line of 
reasoning, omitted variables bias could falsely support the ﬂypaper effect if unobserved 
community characteristics, which affect the technology or effective cost of public 
spending, were systematically related with citizens' private income (Bruce Hamilton 
1983; Jonathan Hamilton 1986; Becker 1996). 
Main theoretical explanations of the flypaper effect are based on the incentives and 
interests of local citizens, politicians and bureaucrats. The explanations based on fiscal 
illusion of citizens holds that the choice model of the representative citizen might be mis-
speciﬁed because the local citizen confuses the income effect generated by 
intergovernmental transfers with a price effect that reduces the average effective cost of 
local public spending (Gramlich 1977; Courant et al. 1979; Dollery and Worthington 
                                                          
1 For surveys, see Bailey and Connolly (1998), Gamkhar and Shah (2007), and Inman (2008). 
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1996). In this sense, the theory of “fiscal illusion” argues that the ﬂypaper effect is a result 
of voters’ failure to correctly assess the average cost of producing public service when 
unconditional grants pay for part of the service. If a local government receives an 
unconditional grant, it can raise the level of public service without raising the tax price 
voters pay for public service. To voters, this might seem as if the costs of producing public 
services have been reduced. They may therefore demand more public services than they 
would have if they had perceived the actual service costs correctly. Related arguments 
hold that the local citizen is not fully informed and fails to see the local public budget. 
Filimon et al. (1982) considers that the representative voter fails to see through the veil 
of government budgets; he does not know the level of aid received by the local 
government. Or even when fully informed, might not behave completely rationally. Hines 
and Thaler (1995) link aspects of loss of risk aversion and lack of fungibility between 
different types of local governments’ funds. If the contributors are more sensitive to 
declines than to increases in their welfare, and do not handle changes in current income 
similarly to changes in future income, then sub-national governments are more likely to 
expand their expenditures by financing themselves with transfers than with their own 
revenues.  
Another line of arguments is based on the politicians' behavior. In a seminal work, 
McGuire (1975) argued that the politicians seek to perpetuate themselves in the political 
power thus increasing the level of public spending at the lowest possible political cost. 
Some scholars have used political science arguments that exploit the role that inefficient 
political institutions have in revealing citizens' preferences. From this perspective, the 
flypaper effect is a consequence of an inability of citizens to write complete “political 
contracts” with their elected officials. The works of Chernick (1979) and Knight (2002) 
offers specifications of a political contract between a donor central government and a 
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recipient local government to understand the flypaper effect. Chernick (1979) specifies 
donor-recipient contracting as an auction. Assuming an exogenous level of central 
government aid, local governments bid for the right to provide aided services by offering 
to share the costs of provision. Beginning with the highest offer price, the central 
government selects recipient governments until its grants budget is exhausted. The 
resulting allocation will equalize the marginal contribution of each local government to 
the incremental benefits from the provision of the local service. Local governments with 
the highest valuations will provide more services and receive more aid. On his side, 
Knight (2002) specifies and estimates a political contracting model for grants policy that 
sets both the aggregate size of the aid budget and its allocation. The budget is chosen to 
ensure its passage and to maximize local constituent net benefits for the central 
government’s agenda-setter. Again, the allocation process is an auction. Legislators bid 
to be part of the winning coalition by offering to vote for the grants budget in return 
intergovernmental aid. The agenda-setter picks the smallest 51 percent of the bids. He 
then sets his own grant award to maximize the net benefits to his own constituents. Those 
legislators whose state or local governments value the aided local service most highly 
make the winning offers. The result is again a positive correlation between grants awarded 
and local spending.  
Regional fiscal literature also has argued that local bureaucrats try to maximize their 
monetary and non-monetary income, giving a novel explanation for the flypaper effect. 
The main work is the application by King (1994) of the model of bureaucratic behavior 
of Niskanen (1968). According to King, the public budget is the result of a negotiation 
between the representatives of the median voter (the sponsor) and the members of the 
bureaucracy (the bureau). The sponsor and the bureau have conflicting interests: the first 
seeks to ensure his reelection by maximizing the welfare of the median voter, the second 
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tries to maximize the public budget because his pay, power and prestige increase with it. 
In other words, the sponsor desires a production of public goods as close as possible to 
the one demanded by the median voter (exactly what is predicted by the classical model) 
and the bureau to a far higher one. In this vein, the higher is the bureaucratic complexity 
of a local government, the higher the cost to supervise its activity in terms of other actors 
(politicians and/or voters), and then the higher the autonomy of the local bureaucrats in 
the definition of the local public spending. Since local bureaucrats have preferences for a 
higher expenditure level than the other actors, this should lead to a larger flypaper effect 
in the granted local governments with a higher bureaucratic complexity 2. 
Finally, another very important topic in the fiscal federalism literature is the possible 
existence of an asymmetric response of local governments to the sign of variation of 
intergovernmental transfers (cuts versus increases). Gramlich (1987) suggests that public 
expenditure is often related to clientele behavior that makes its reduction problematic. 
Stine (1994) argues that ﬁscal illusion, ﬂypaper effects and interest groups might 
determine an asymmetric response to a change in intergovernmental grants. Borge et al. 
(2005) and Levaggi and Smith (2005) use costs of adjustment to justify the asymmetric 
response. In general terms, these scholars have pointed out that losses in transfers may be 
partly compensated by local governments willing to preserve expenditures by raising 
additional taxes: this is the “ﬁscal replacement” effect pointed out by Gramlich (1987). 
In this vein, Volden (2002) and Gamkhar (2002) argued that the probability of detecting 
ﬁscal replacement for speciﬁc grants and spending programs is higher than in the case of 
block grants and total expenditures. Alternatively, local governments may magnify the 
spending response to cuts in grants by lowering own revenues as well: this gives rise to 
the “fiscal restraint” type of asymmetry, also called super-flypaper effect by Gamkhar 
                                                          
2 For more recent explanations of this line of research, see Culis and Jones (2009). 
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and Oates (1996). Hines and Thaler (1995) suggest that this kind of ‘‘super-ﬂypaper 
effect’’ could be explained by assuming that taxpayers are loss averse (e.g., much more 
sensitive to decreases in their welfare than to increases) and that they do not treat funds 
as fungible. 
 
 
3. Empirical background 
Numerous studies have investigated the effects of various types of intergovernmental 
transfers on local government’s fiscal behavior. In a broad sense, these empirical analysis 
are based on a model with a representative local citizen that maximizes her utility, which 
depends on private consumption (c) and local government spending (g), subject to her 
total income, which is the sum of her private income ( y ) and her share of ﬁscal transfers 
( f ). In this context, the flypaper effect (FP) can be defined as: 
 
            yf ggFP −=                (1)       
 
 
where fg  and yg  denote the change in government spending in response to an increase 
of one monetary unit in fiscal transfers or private income, respectively. Within this 
empirical literature, only few studies have analyzed asymmetric effects in terms of the 
sign of variation of intergovernmental transfers. The table 1 lists some of the most 
commonly cited studies.  
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<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
An important number of studies have found evidence supporting flypaper effect across 
time and in different contexts. The empirical literature carried out for developed countries 
point out that for the United States the rate of change of local expenditures relative to 
intergovernmental grants ranges from 0.43 (Gramlich and Galper 1973) to more than 1.00 
(Case et al. 1993); the corresponding rate of change in individual income is 4 to 6 times 
smaller. While for the European economies the effect displays even more sensitiveness. 
This literature shows that while an extra dollar in private income increases public 
spending by $0.02 (Levaggi and Zanola 2003), an equivalent increase in ﬁscal transfers 
triggers a rise in spending that lies $2.09 (Tovmo and Falch 2002). 
There are only very few studies available for medium income economies like Latin 
American Countries (LAC). Vegh and Vuletin (2015) have showed that the ﬂypaper 
effect (between 1.6 to 1.9) should be a decreasing function of the correlation between 
ﬁscal transfers and private income for a sample of Argentinean provinces. Espinosa 
(2011) uses a panel of 31 Mexican states to derive a sizeable flypaper effect. For 
Colombia, Melo (2002) found evidence of the flypaper effect when sub-national entities 
are highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, an analysis of 
asymmetries in response to transfers shows that sub-national authorities try to cover the 
reduction in transfers when the percentage of transfers into the total current revenues is 
high. 
The empirical test of the second type of asymmetries, evaluated mainly for developed 
countries, about the reaction to increasing as opposed to decreasing grants has been 
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mixed. Some studies ﬁnd support in favor of the hypothesis (Heyndels 2001; Deller and 
Maher 2006; Lago-Peñas 2008) whereas others do not (Gamkhar and Oates 1996; 
Gennari and Messina 2014).  
 
 
 
4. Regional public finances: The Uruguayan case  
Although Uruguay has begun to implement an incipient process of decentralization, based 
on the constitutional reform of 1996, it is still fiscally-centralized3. In the period 1991-
2016, more than 90% of national public expenditure was directly executed by the central 
government. Regional governments (second level of government) were responsible for 
10% at most of public spending (Table 2). 
  
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
 
The powers formally assigned to the regional governments, the second level of 
government, are defined in the Basic Law of Governance and Administration of the 
Departments (No. 9.515), which has remained unchanged since 1935. In this sense, the 
traditional powers and responsibilities of these sub-national governments in Uruguay are 
                                                          
3Uruguay is divided into 19 departments that are the second level of government after the Central 
Government. For a detail of Uruguay's political division, see Figure A.1 in the Annex. 
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public services that in other Latin America countries would be assigned to the third level 
of government (BID 2017). The main activities in question are: investment and 
maintenance of urban equipment, road maintenance, traffic organization, public transport, 
public area cleaning, public lighting, cemetery services, health control and land use 
planning.  
For their part, fiscal revenues of sub-national governments can be classified into two main 
categories: 
• Own revenues: local taxes, or taxes fixed by the central government but 
administered and collected by regional governments. 
• Intergovernmental transfers: conditioned and non-conditioned transfers.. In this 
sense, more than the 90% of intergovernmental transfers in Uruguay are non-
conditioned transfers. 
 
The main local taxes are the property tax on urban and suburban real assets, and vehicle 
taxes. Next on the list comes the tax on the purchase and sale of live animals. For its part, 
the main tax fixed by the central government but administered and collected by regional 
governments is the property tax on rural real assets. Over the analyzed period has been 
produced significant variations of the regional tax rates and their bases (BID 2009, and 
Muinelo-Gallo et al. 2017).  
As pointed in Figure 1, we can observe an increase of the importance of unconditional 
intergovernmental transfers in the last decade as a source of sub-national government’s 
revenues. 
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<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 
 
The visual inspection of Figure 1 shows that the increase in unconditional transfers from 
2003 onwards is more pronounced than the increase in regional governments’ own 
revenues.  
The intergovernmental transfers in Uruguay are not clearly formula-based or neither 
purely on ad hoc basis. These transfers are defined in the National Budget Law in each 
five-year period of government. But it had important changes over the different 
government periods analyzed. In the first two five-year period of government, 1991-1995 
and 1996-2000, the National Budget Law has defined four types of intergovernmental 
transfers. One type was established to contribute to the payment of regional governments 
employer contributions to social security and is distributed proportional to the number of 
civil servants in each regional government. A second type is an aliquot of fuel 
consumption tax (IMESI) without setting a specific target for funds. These transfers are 
distributed proportional to the contribution of each regional government to the generation 
of revenues. A third type is subsidies to finance new infrastructures or maintenance of old 
ones through a “National Plan of Municipal Infrastructure” administered by the central 
government. Finally, the four type include subsides to finance rural roads that are 
administered also by the central government. The distribution of these last two subsidies 
linked to infrastructure had an important inertia about the spending on these items in the 
previous period based on two criteria (50% each): population (quite stable in Uruguay) 
and surface, allowing some political adjustment to the needs of current period. 
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However, despite of the fact that intergovernmental transfers are defined in the National 
Budget Law, during different government periods there are important emerging laws that 
add supplementary items to intergovernmental transfer legislation. In many cases the 
additional transfers are justified by particularly circumstances like a financial crisis in a 
regional government, a drought or a flood, and frequently these ends up becoming 
permanent items; because of regional government’s pressure to maintain or even increase 
resources in the next government period (Muinelo et al. 2017). 
In the National Budget Law for the period 2001-2016 were incorporated the reforms of 
the National Constitution of 1996. These reforms were expected to improve the transfers 
system and to avoid additional transfers (on ad hoc basis) not included in the National 
Budget Law. This new National Constitution laws establish two types of mechanisms for 
transfers (Articles 214 and 298).  
The Article 214 stipulates that in each five-year period an aliquot of the total national 
budget must be distributed among the regional governments. This aliquot was 3,18% in 
2001 and progressively increasing to 3,54% in 2005 and was fixed in 3,33% for all over 
the period 2006-2016. A main proportion of that aliquot is financed the “National Plan of 
Municipal Infrastructure” and the maintenance of rural roads (both administered by 
central government). The remaining funds are distributed between regional governments 
using two criteria. One based on indicators of population, surface, inverse of regional 
GDP and percentage of households with unfulfilled needs (25% each). The other criteria 
are based on the percentage distribution among regional governments in the previous 
government period. The result might arise from average between the two criteria but is 
not so clear. In turn, the percentage of remaining funds (published in the National Budget 
Laws: Nº 17.296 for 2001-2005 and Nº 17.930 for 2006-2016) arises from political 
negotiation between the central government and the Congress of Heads of regional 
17 
 
governments (established by the Constitution of 1996 as a representative council of 
regional governments).  
The other article of the National Constitution that regulates intergovernmental transfers 
is the N° 298, the Development Fund of the Interior (DFI), which is also defined in the 
National Budget Law. The aims of DFI are local and regional development and 
decentralization. The DFI is formed by an aliquot (about 11%) of the taxes that the central 
government collects from the different departments of the country excluding Montevideo. 
However, only the 33,5% of DFI funding goes directly to the regional governments and 
the remaining 66,5% is directly executed by the central government.  
With the reforms in articles 214 and 298, the central government intends to avoid the 
logic of negotiations post discussion on National Budget Law. Nevertheless, regional 
governments continued pushing central government to make extra transfers for items 
outside the scope of the National Budget Law. As in previous periods, these extra 
transfers usually are justified as temporary items due to particularly events or 
circumstances in one or a group of regional governments. In practice, once again, the 
extra items became permanent (Muinelo-Gallo et al. 2017). 
In sum, over the different government periods 1991-1995 and 1996-2000, and in 
subsequent 2001-2005 and 2006-2016, the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in 
Uruguay has unclear mechanisms, with some guiding criteria but far away from clearly 
and technically defined technical formulas and with an implicit degree of political 
negotiation between central and regional governments.  
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5. Empirical methodology 
The empirical strategy applied to a panel data of 18 departments during the period 1991 
to 20164, is aimed at evaluating the sensitiveness of regional budgets to transfers by 
measuring two types of asymmetries. The first one concerns the magnitude of the reaction 
to increases in private income as compared to increases in unconditional transfers (the 
standard ﬂypaper effect); the second type of asymmetry is related to the sign of the 
variation in transfers (cuts versus increases). We assume that decision-makers are subject 
to a revenue constraint and discretionary set the level of expenditures (and own revenue) 
to appeal to a utility maximizing median voter. For the sake of comparison, we follow 
previous works in the literature, and estimate a reduced form equation on the expenditure 
side, which can be derived from the analytical framework: 
 
 +++++= h it
h
ithitAitFitYit XAFYG 0             (2) 
 
where i and t  capture region (department) and year, respectively. The variables G , Y
and F  represent regional government spending, regional income (proxy by regional real 
GDP), and non-conditional fiscal transfers5, respectively, all expressed in real per cápita 
terms. While the variable A  is introduced to capture another possible asymmetrical 
response of regional government’s expenditure to variations in transfers: 
 
( )1−−= tttit FFDA  
                                                          
4 The department of Montevideo was not considered because this department only began receiving transfers 
in 2006. Up to that year all its revenues were based on own sources. 
5 These kinds of transfers are totally non-earmarked and are hence unconditional. 
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where tD  is a dummy equal to 1 when transfers are decreasing and 0 otherwise. A 
rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetry (i.e., 0:0 =AH  ) implies that F  is the 
expenditure response to increasing grants, while AF  +  is the coefficient on declining 
grants; in this case 0A  means that we are in presence of a fiscal replacement type of 
asymmetry while 0A  reveals a super flypaper effect. 
We use the vector X  to denote social and political economy determinants of expenditure 
decisions6. In this sense, we include regional income inequality measure to control for 
potential the demand for regional services; and two political economy variables like local 
governor pre-electoral period, an electoral volatility indicator, and the Pedersen index, 
which allows us to observe the consequences of the separation in time of the national and 
departmental (regional) elections7. Volatility reflects the percentage of voters who varied 
their vote between the national and regional elections, being an indicator of the stability 
of the system of winning parties. In this case it is considered as the passage of the vote 
from one electoral party to another between national and regional elections within the 
same electoral cycle (intra-cyclical volatility). 
Most estimations include regional and time effects. Residuals are calculated using robust 
variances and relaxing the assumption of independence within groups by allowing the 
presence of error autocorrelation within departments.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Table A.1 in the Annex details all variables definitions and their sources. 
7 It is important to point out that since 2004 the sub-national authorities’ elections in Uruguay have been 
separated from the national elections that up to that moment were carried out jointly. 
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6. Econometric issues 
The estimation of the equation (2) is potentially affected by some relevant econometric 
problems. A first issue is represented by the possible presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity which, if it is correlated with regressors, leads to inconsistent estimates. To 
help solving this problem, the inclusion of a large set of controls may sometimes be the 
right choice, but in many cases, it is not enough. To solve this problem our baseline model 
for per capita total expenditures was estimated with fixed and random effects using the 
whole set of controls and with panel-robust standard errors8. 
A second estimation issue is the possible endogeneity of the variable representing 
transfers from central government. When investigating the effects of intergovernmental 
transfers on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of 
these transfers as an exogenous factor. Central governments often set transfers based on 
characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. If transfers to sub-national 
governments are set simultaneously with local expenditures, then these can have an 
impact on transfers, creating an endogeneity problem which should be treated properly to 
get consistent parameter estimates. This would be the case for instance with specific 
programs where lobbying can be at work to get the related financing (Knight 2002), or 
when the design of the transfers system is done based on economic and political features, 
which are also associated with spending (Johansson 2003). In this paper we take two 
approaches to deal with the issue. Firstly, we estimate the model instrumenting 
contemporaneous transfers with lagged values of the same variable. Secondly, we 
estimate a two-stage model. In a first stage, we estimate intergovernmental transfer 
equations, and, in a second stage, we take the predicted value of the first stage as the 
                                                          
8 Table A.2 in the Annex details summary statistics of all variables. 
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explanatory variable of the second stage departmental expenditure equation. Also, since 
regional expenditures are characterized by marked persistency, we check if our empirical 
evidence is robust to the estimation of a dynamic model by including the first lag of per 
capita local expenditure in the initial specification and estimating through instrumental 
variables.  
 
 
7. Empirical results: baseline models 
Table 3 reports our baseline regressions results. The first two columns present the results 
of OLS estimations with fixed (column 1) and random (column 2) effects models. In 
columns 3 and 4 to deal with endogeneity problem, we estimate the panel using two-stage 
least squares (with fixed and random effects model, respectively), and instrumenting the 
transfer variable; regional GDP and the asymmetric term with the first lag of the same 
variable. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we add dynamics to the model including the first 
lag of the dependent variable and instrumenting the transfer variable; regional GDP and 
the asymmetric term with the first lag of the same variable, and estimating the panel using 
Arellano-Bond and System-GMM panel data estimators. 
 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
 
 
Our results show that the sensitivity of total regional governments spending to variations 
in regional GDP ranges from 0.003 to 0.01. However, the stimulative impact of 
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intergovernmental transfers is much more important ranging from 0.77 to 1.15. In turn, 
the coefficient on asymmetry is not significant in all baseline specifications of table 3.  
The magnitude and sign of the control variables is consistent among all the specifications. 
Regional spending is positively influenced by income inequality. This could be explained 
by the fact inequities may boost the demand for regional services. In relation with political 
variables we have very interesting insights. First, regional spending is undoubtedly 
subject to electoral cycles, since regional expenditures soar as local elections approach. 
The empirical evidence also shows a significant effect in relation with the congruence in 
voting between national and regional elections. This volatility, measured through the 
Pedersen index, indicates the net changes in the percentage of votes that each party wins 
or loses between national and regional elections. In this sense, the increase in intra-
cyclical volatility (passage of votes from one party to another between national and 
regional elections) has negatively impacted the level of local spending. 
Overall, the empirical evidence shows the presence for Uruguayan regional governments 
of a strong flypaper effect, which is present even controlling for social, economic and 
political factors, and when they are considered fixed and temporal effects. 
 
 
8. Robustness 
In this section we test the robustness of our main results by modifying some important 
aspects of the estimated baseline regressions.  
First, we begin by testing if the coefficients of all variables are sensitive to the inclusion 
of new control variables. In this sense, we include three additional political variables. 
Firstly, we add a dummy variable representing the possibility for the major to be re-
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elected in the following regional election, equal to 1 if the mayor is at the second term 
and thus cannot be re-elected: the coefficient should have a negative sign. However, we 
not observe a significant impact of this variable in all baseline specifications. Secondly, 
we also introduce in all models an index of compactness of the government coalition, 
which is a Herfindahl index of the share of each political party in regional governments: 
in this case the variable should have a negative sign in our regressions. Also, we not 
observe a significant effect of this variable. Finally, we add a dummy variable for the 
political orientation of local bodies, which takes the value of 1 for centre-left majorities 
for the common view that left wing governments tend to increase the role of public 
intervention in the economy, and then spend more than right wing ones. Also, in this case 
we cannot observe a significant impact of this variable. Finally, we estimate all 
regressions with these three political variables at the same time, and we did not obtain 
significant results for any of them. In all these cases, the rest of the explanatory variables 
did not change their sign, significance and magnitude. These results are not reported for 
space reasons but are available upon request. 
Second, to fathom whether the results are being driven by one regional government in our 
sample, we repeat the regressions of table 3 after removing each regional government one 
at time. The results are stable indicating that no single one is driving our results. Again, 
these results are not reported for space reasons but are available upon request 
Finally, we deal more deeply with the possible endogeneity of the variable representing 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Here, we follow a two-step procedure, in which we 
first estimate a transfer equation (first stage). Then we use the estimation of the transfer 
variable as the explanatory variable in the expenditure equation (second stage). In this 
two-stage scenario we perform two types of exercises. In a first instance, we estimate 
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static expenditure models, and, in the second place, we estimate dynamic expenditure 
equations with two types of estimation methods. 
 
 
8.1 Static models 
 
Table 4 shows the first and second stage instrumental variables regressions. The columns 
1, 3 and 5 shows the results from the first stage regressions (i.e., the dependent variable 
is unconditional intergovernmental transfers in real and per capita terms) and columns 2, 
4 and 6 ones from the second stage (i.e., the dependent variable is real government 
spending per capita). 
 
 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
 
 
In the estimation of the transfer equations, in the first instance, we consider the elements 
that should be considered strictly by norm in the allocation of transfers (see section 4). 
Thus, the following variables are included as explanatory variables: the population of the 
department, the departmental real GDP per cápita, the level of departmental poverty and 
the population density. Then, due to the intuition that different elements of political 
negotiation may be influencing the allocation of these transfers, we include variables that 
attempt to capture the influence of these aspects, like political alignment between regional 
and central governments and a department switch variable.  
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We observe that the department’s population size is significant and negatively related to 
per capita transfers. The observed relationship might be driven by a response to the 
perceived presence of scale economies in the delivery of sub-national public services. 
Alternatively, the fiscal bias in favor of smaller (less populous) departments may be 
driven by political motivations, either to secure broad political support from the sub-
national government tier (including less populous rural areas) in the vertical power 
structure, or to secure political support at the national level of actors like senators who 
have specific regional allegiances. The estimations also support the idea that regional 
inequalities have a significant and negative impact on transfers, but its absolute value is 
very small. This result is reflected by the fact that the value of the department’s GDP per 
capita has a negative and significant effect but a very small value on intergovernmental 
transfers. We also observed a significant and positive effect of population density. Those 
departments with higher population density receive a higher amount of transfers per 
capita.  Finally, we observe the impact of variables related to the political economy of the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers. In relation with the political alignment variable, 
we obtain a significant and positive effect. Therefore, about how intergovernmental 
transfers are determined, it can be said that there is logic of reward and punishment 
depending on whether regional governments are aligned politically with the party in 
power in the central government. Also, we observe significant and positive effects of 
switch variable. Those departments that have altered the governing political party during 
the period under review receive more transfers in per capita terms. 
In relation with the second stage equations, the estimations of table 4 allow us to ratify 
the results in terms of significance and sign of all the relationships found. In this case the 
magnitude of the flypaper varies between 0.60-0.76, and we do not observe significant 
effects in the case of the asymmetry variable. 
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8.2 Dynamic models 
Table 5 presents the estimates of dynamic models through two estimation methods (GMM 
and SYS-GMM). The fitted values of transfers of first stage of table 4 are used as 
explanatory variables over different dynamic regional expenditure equations of table 5. 
In this sense, the fitted value of transfers of column 1 of the table 4 is considered in 
estimations of columns 1 and 2 of table 5; the estimation of transfers of column 3 of table 
4 is used as explanatory variable of columns 3 and 4 of table 5; and, finally, the predicted 
value of transfers of column 5 of table 4 is used as explanatory variable of regressions of 
columns 5 and 6 of table 5. 
 
<<Table 5 about here>> 
 
It is important to note that despite observing significant effects of persistence in per capita 
expenditure levels in all these equations of the table 5, we also observe an important and 
significant flypaper effect. Also, it is important to point out that in the latter case of 
dynamic models; we not find a conclusive evidence of an asymmetrical reaction of 
regional expenditures with respect to the sign of transfers’ changes. The coefficients of 
asymmetry are significant. 
 
9. Conclusions 
Asymmetries in sub-national government response to transfers from central government 
is one of the most popular and documented subjects in the fiscal federalism literature. 
Despite a widespread success overseas, in Uruguay null empirical research has been done 
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on this matter. Our work has started to fill this gap, by investigating the extent to which 
spending decisions by regional governments are influenced by changes in upper tier 
unconditional transfers.  
Empirical results have highlighted a remarkable standard flypaper effect for local 
authorities, mostly in line with previous studies for European countries. However, it was 
not finding evidence on the asymmetric behavior of expenditures with respect to the 
direction of changes in transfers (cuts versus increases). 
Conventional demographic, social, and institutional controls have mostly the expected 
sign. But, most important, politics factors also are confirmed to play a crucial role in local 
budgeting processes. In transfers equations we observe the importance of the political 
alignment between the central and regional government and the condition of being a 
department that has varied of political party in office during the period (switch 
department) to receive more regional transfers. Estimations also show that local spending 
is subject to electoral cycles, while the increase of voters’ intra-cyclical volatility (passage 
of votes from one party to another between national and regional elections) has negatively 
impacted the level of regional spending. 
Due to the list of variables used in the different expenditures estimates we could argue 
that the presence and size of the ﬂypaper effect does not seem to be entirely attributable 
to a mismatch between local policymakers and the local population. Demand-side factors, 
such as the ﬁscal illusion, or behavioral phenomena as aversion to losses, appear to be 
determinant in the case of Uruguay. Due to local taxes are property-based, it is likely that 
only owners will correctly receive the price of local taxes. However, tenants may not face 
the full price of taxes or may have less accurate information on the prices of the taxes 
they face, and therefore vote in favor of higher expenditures (Goetz, 1977). Further, if 
local taxpayers are more sensitive to decreases than increases in their welfare, and if they 
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do not similarly treat changes in current and future revenues, then subnational 
governments could be more likely to expand their budgets with subsidies than with taxes. 
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Table 1 – Composition of General Government expenditures (1991-2016), selected years 
 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2016 
Central Government 94,04% 94,04% 93,24% 93,17% 94,19% 93,66% 
Regional Governments 5,96% 5,96% 6,76% 6,83% 5,81% 6,34% 
General Government 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning and Budget Office - Presidency of the Republic 
 
 
Figure 1 – Evolution of Regional Governments finances in Uruguay (1991 – 2016) 
All variables are expressed in real and per cápita terms 
 
Note: All values are without Montevideo department. 
Source: Planning and Budget Office - Presidency of the Republic.
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Table 2 - Estimates of the flypaper and asymmetry effects 
Author Data Sample 
fg  yg  
Flypaper 
effect 
Asymmetry 
effects 
High income countries 
Gramlich 
and Galper 
(1973) 
Aggregate US 
state and local 
government data 
(quarterly) 
1954-1972 0.43 0.10 0.33 -- 
Case et al. 
(1993) 
48 US states 1970-1985 0.65-1.02 0.11-0.17 0.54-0.85 -- 
Gamkhar 
and Oates 
(1996) 
Aggregate US 
state and local 
government data 
(annual) 
1953-1991 0.62-0.73 0.11-0.28 0.51-0.45 
Not 
significant 
Heyndels 
(2001) 
308 Flemish 
municipalities 
1989-1996 1.03-1.13 0.04-0.05 0.99-1.08 
Significant 
(fiscal 
replacement) 
Gemmell et 
al. (2002) 
54 English and 
Welsh counties 
1991-1994 0.70-0.75 0.10-0.22 0.60-0.53 -- 
Tovmo and 
Falch 
(2002) 
605 Norwegian 
rural 
municipalities 
1934-1935 1.31-2.09 0.07-0.10 1.24-1.99 -- 
Levaggi 
and Zanola 
(2003) 
18 Italian regions 1989-1993 0.56-0.84 0.01-0.02 0.55-0.82 
Significant 
(Super 
flypaper 
effect) 
Deller and 
Maher 
(2006) 
US 
Wisconsin 
municipalities’ 
 
1990 -
2000 
5.838  0.046 5.792 
Significant 
(fiscal 
replacement) 
Lago-Peñas 
(2008) 
313 Galician 
municipalities 
Spain 
1985-1995 0.88-0.96 
0.001-
0.009 
0.87-0.96 
Significant 
(fiscal 
replacement) 
Genari and 
Messina 
(2014) 
8.000 Italian 
municipalities 
1999-2006 0.79-1.43 0.02-0.06 0.77-1.43 
Not 
significant 
Middle income countries 
Melo 
(2002) 
32 Colombian 
regional 
governments 
1980-1997 1.13 0.11 0.40 
Not 
significant 
Espinosa 
(2011) 
31 Mexican 
states  
1993-2003 1.563 0.082 1.481 -- 
Vegh and 
Vuletin 
(2015) 
23 Argentinian 
provinces 
1972-2006 1.69-1.95 
0.063-
0.065 
1.63-1.90 -- 
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Table 3 – Baseline regressions results 
 
OLS 2SLS GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FE RE FE RE GMM-FD SYS-GMM 
Lagged regional spending -- -- -- -- 
0.420*** 
(0.018) 
0.387*** 
(0.039) 
f  
1.056*** 
(0.086) 
1.037*** 
(0.088) 
0.957*** 
(0.103) 
0.929*** 
(0.105) 
0.734*** 
(0.135) 
0.776*** 
(0.083) 
y  
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Electoral cycle 
153.462*** 
(57.586) 
154.029*** 
(60.262) 
160.979*** 
(58.077) 
162.148*** 
(60.827) 
71.118*** 
(18.361) 
81.128** 
(46.318) 
Pedersen index 
-64.847*** 
(17.560) 
-65.908*** 
(18.418) 
-57.929*** 
(18.053) 
-57.996*** 
(18.853) 
241.562 
(812.248) 
-75.382*** 
(14.425) 
Income inequality 
135.715* 
(79.900) 
173.082** 
(85.388) 
125.560 
(81.091) 
161.550* 
(86.493) 
71.685 
(57.950) 
113.416*** 
(46.232) 
Asymmetry 
-0.718 
(0.469) 
-0.741 
(0.503) 
-0.648 
(0.478) 
-0.664 
(0.510) 
0.225 
(0.240) 
0.001 
(0.306) 
Regional effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Time effects No No No No No No 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.887 0.614 0.886 0.610 -- -- 
J-statistic -- -- -- -- 13.961 -- 
Prob (J-statistic) -- -- -- -- 0.235 -- 
AR (1) -- -- -- -- -- 0.000 
Hansen test -- -- -- -- -- 0.839 
Observations 446 446 446 446 428 428 
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Table 4   – Robustness: Static models 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IV: First  
stage 
IV: Second  
stage 
IV: First  
stage 
IV: Second  
stage 
IV: First  
stage 
IV: Second  
stage 
 Regional transfers Regional spending Regional transfers Regional spending Regional transfers Regional spending 
Department population 
-0.309*** 
(0.034) 
-- 
-0.313*** 
(0.034) 
-- 
-0.268*** 
(0.028) 
-- 
Department GDP pc 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-- 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-- 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-- 
Poverty 
-9.641 
(19.631) 
-- 
-12.049 
(19.725) 
-- 
26.448 
(26.448) 
-- 
Density 
1209.673*** 
(156.955) 
 
1220.436*** 
(155.506) 
 
826.089*** 
(116.797) 
-- 
Political Alignment -- -- 
169.514** 
(96.702) 
-- -- -- 
Switch Department -- -- -- -- 
199.075*** 
(63.486) 
-- 
f  -- 
0.618*** 
(0.102) 
-- 
0.669*** 
(0.041) 
-- 
0.771*** 
(0.145) 
y   
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-- 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Electoral cycle -- 
107.230* 
(62.687) 
-- 
110.327* 
(66.600) 
-- 
105.707* 
(65.254) 
Pedersen index -- 
-24.876* 
(17.515) 
-- 
-27.029* 
(16.011) 
-- 
-46.942** 
(21.212) 
Income inequality 
-- 181.786** 
(89.317) 
-- 
201.279** 
(93.771) 
-- 
194.201** 
(92.417) 
Asymmetry 
-- -0.090 
(0.478) 
-- 
-0.046 
(0.503) 
-- 
-0.121 
(0.489) 
Department effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 91.273 0.880 91.305 0.865 91.304 0.882 
Observations 428 428 428 428 428 428 
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Table    5 – Robustness: Dynamic models 
 
 
GMM SYS-GMM GMM SYS-GMM GMM SYS-GMM 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged regional spending 
0.491*** 
(0.019) 
0.453*** 
(0.044) 
0.535*** 
(0.022) 
0.505*** 
(0.043) 
0.480*** 
(0.009) 
0.454*** 
(0.043) 
f  
0.781** 
(0.491) 
0.431*** 
(0.091) 
0.245** 
(0.136) 
0.400*** 
(0.037) 
0.784*** 
(0.230) 
0.557*** 
(0.104) 
y  
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
Electoral cycle 
59.043 
(50.931) 
18.262 
(51.504) 
23.122 
(32.843) 
17.218 
(53.187) 
56.829** 
(26.941) 
24.182 
(50.585) 
Pedersen index 
55.419 
(12.115) 
-51.444*** 
(15.532) 
36.664 
(12.231) 
-18.864* 
(13.525) 
48.382 
(863.945) 
-65.655*** 
(16.403) 
Income inequality 
161.388*** 
(34.034) 
147.937*** 
(51.258) 
155.313*** 
(43.867) 
165.740*** 
(52.708) 
107.319* 
(67.733) 
147.842*** 
(50.346) 
Asymmetry 
0.641 
(0.635) 
0.610 
(0.617) 
0.776 
(0.730) 
0.691 
(0.626) 
0.718 
(0.748) 
0.593 
(0.511) 
Department effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
J-statistic 13.063 -- 13.438 -- 13.740 -- 
Prob (J-statistic) 0.289 -- 0.266 -- 0.318 -- 
AR (1) -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
Hansen test -- 0.988 -- 0.957 -- 0.989 
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393 
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Annex 
Figure A. 1. - Administrative division of the República Oriental del Uruguay 
 
Source: National Civil Service Office of the Presidency of the Republic, Uruguay. 
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Table A.1 - Data definitions and sources 
Variable                            Definition Source 
 
Regional 
Government 
expenditure 
 
Regional Government total expenditure per capita in 
constant pesos of 2017 
 
Planning and Budget 
Office - Presidency of 
the Republic  
Ministry of Economy 
and Finance 
General Accounting 
Office 
Social Security Bank 
 
Non-conditional 
Transfers (TR) 
 
Non-conditional Intergovernmental per capita transfers 
in constant pesos of 2017 
 
Planning and Budget 
Office - Presidency of 
the Republic  
Ministry of Economy 
and Finance 
General Accounting 
Office 
Social Security Bank 
 
Regional GDP 
per cápita 
 
GDP pc of the department in constant pesos of 2017 
 
Central Bank of Uruguay 
Office of Planning and 
Budget Office - 
Presidency of the 
Republic  
 
Electoral Cycle Categorical variable from 1 to 5, which take the value 
of 5 in the election year. 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
Department 
Density 
Number of inhabitants per square kilometre Continuous Household 
Survey of the National 
Institute of Statistics of 
Uruguay 
Pedersen Index Index that considers the percentage of voters who 
varied the political party of their vote between the 
national and regional election 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
Income inequality Regional Gini index Continuous Household 
Survey of the National 
Institute of Statistics of 
Uruguay 
Asymmetry Asymmetrical response of regional governments 
expenditure to variations in transfers (cuts versus 
increases) 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
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Variable                            Definition Source 
Department 
Population 
Department population Continuous Household 
Survey of the National 
Institute of Statistics of 
Uruguay 
Political 
Alignment 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the political 
party of the local government at time t is not the same 
as the political party that governs the central state and 
0 otherwise 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
Compact Index of compactness of the governing coalition 
(COMPit), which is an Herfindal index of the share of 
each party sitting in local governments. 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
Re-election Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mayor is at the second 
term and thus cannot be re-elected 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
Local 
government 
political 
orientation 
Dummy variable equal to 1 for centre-left majorities  Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
 
Switch 
Department 
Categorical variable which takes the value 2 if the 
department has varied the government party two or 
more times during the analysis period, take the value 1 
if varied one time, and 0 otherwise 
Electoral Court of the 
República Oriental del 
Uruguay 
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Table A.2 - Summary statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Observations 
Regional expenditure 
  
Overall 12.634,9 5.761,547 3.976,575 38.339,52 N=446 
Between   4.851,872 7.053,401 28.398,69 n=18 
Within   3.116,196 1.319,989 29.415,93 T-bar=24,778 
Non-conditional transfers   
Overall 3.372,8 2.415,724 145,606 12.391,93 N=446 
Between   1.108,971 1.046,612 5.524,909 n=18 
Within   2.172,456 1.563,382 10.239,86 T-bar=24,778 
Regional GDP pc 
  
Overall 257.961,1 106.784,500 110.096,300 720.833,900 N=446 
Between   66.934,260 165.765,300 397.363,500 n=18 
Within   84.505,290 69.110,520 581.431,500 T-bar=24,778 
Electoral cycle 
  
Overall 3,033 1,538 1 6 N=446 
Between   0,032 1 6 n=18 
Within      T-bar=24,778 
Density 
  
Overall 14,373 20,874 4,858 115,793 N=446 
Between   23,371 5,044 104,542 n=18 
Within   2,120 1,661 25,571 T-bar=24,778 
Pedersen Index 
  
Overall 9,818 7,561 0,860 19,700 N=446 
Between   1,015 7,321 10,250 n=18 
Within   7,510 0,428 21,509 T-bar=24,778 
Income Inequality 
  
Overall 3,888 2,685 0,454 21,704 N=446 
Between   1,966 1,262 9,043 n=18 
Within   1,833 2,446 16,548 T-bar=24,778 
Asymmetry 
  
Overall -115.402 251.266 -1876.714 0 N=446 
Between   45.016 -226.123 -36.716 n=18 
Within   247.219 -1831.102 110.721 T-bar=24,778 
Population 
  
Overall 107.061,5 96.266,72 25.683,7 551.681,4 N=446 
Between  98.175,39 25.968,95 481.640,8 n=18 
Within  12.002,82 18.752,62 177.102,1 T-bar=24,778 
Political Alignment 
  
Overall 0,400 0,490 0 1 N=446 
Between   0,260 0 1 n=18 
Within      T-bar=24,778 
Compact Overall 0,451 0,115 0,299 0,885 N=446 
Between   0,101 0,339 0,752 n=18 
Within   0,054 0,327 0,622 T-bar=24,778 
Re-election Overall 0,633 0,482 0 1 N=446 
Between   0,235 0 1 n=18 
Within      T-bar=24,778 
Local government political 
orientation 
Overall 0,129 0,335 0 1 N=446 
Between   0,157 0 1 n=18 
Within      T-bar=24,778 
Switch Department Overall 1,112 0,879 0 2 N=446 
Between   0,900 0 2 n=18 
Within      T-bar=24,778 
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